“Sudan is a disaster area for human rights. We must turn the eyes of the world upon the atrocities in the Sudan.”[1]

“The human rights situation in Sudan is not marketable to the American people.”[2]

“Everyone has the right to thought, conscience and religion…No one shall be held in slavery or servitude and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms…No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.”[3]

I. Introduction

Until January 9, 2005, the oldest civil war in the world was being fought in Sudan, the largest country in Africa. In January, a comprehensive peace accord was signed ending the civil war that had been uninterrupted for the past twenty-two years. Chaplains had served for the last seven years of this civil war and continue to serve in the peace process. They are Christian clergy who are promoters of human rights and agents of reconciliation between God and humanity, the northern Sudanese government and the southern Sudanese rebel army, soldiers and prisoners of war (POWs), and civilians and the various military or militia organizations. The southern Sudanese chaplaincy exists to minister to and enforce basic human rights for the southern army, northern prisoners of war, and all Sudanese civilians.

Chaplains in Sudan are the embodiment of peace. They have served weaponless on the frontlines of the war to minister pastorally to the southern Sudanese soldiers and to encourage the southern soldiers to engage the northern soldiers appropriately and to take northern soldiers who surrender as prisoners, instead of killing them. When northern soldiers were captured, the chaplains oversaw their care and ensured that they were treated humanely while POWs. A constant concern of the chaplains was the welfare of civilians, especially southern Sudanese civilians who are oppressed by their government, had been abused by the rebel army, and are still terrorized by militant extremist groups. To understand the significance of the chaplains’ role one must have a clearer picture of the context in which they served.

II. Civil War

Sudan’s conflict is old and complex. For many, the north-south war is rooted in the old toxic relationship between Arab masters and African slaves. For the religious, it is a conflict between northern Islam and southern tribal religions, animism, and Christianity. For economists, it is a war between the impoverished herdsmen and civilians of the south and the north made wealthy from oil profit. For global experts, it is a war of civilizations: Arabic civilization and African civilization. In the words of US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, there is “no greater tragedy on the face of the earth than the tragedy that is unfolding in the Sudan.”[4]

A. The Government of Sudan (GOS)

The government of Sudan is led by the National Islamic Front, which began as the Islamic Charter Front and was known as the Muslim Brotherhood during the 1970s. It has campaigned for the application of Sharia[5] and regularly uses Islamic sloganeering. It has demonstrated a high degree of ruthless political cunning and a readiness to use unprecedented levels of physical violence. Beneath its surface political activity over the years, it has acquired arms and trained loyalist militias.

Starting in 1983, the regime in northern Sudan has bombed, starved, and enslaved black southern Sudanese in an effort to subject them to Islamic rule. In response, southern Sudan organized a rebel movement and army—the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). The SPLA defends against attacks from their government and fights for either a secular, unified Sudan—as opposed to the north’s Muslim theocracy—or for full southern independence.[6]Over the past twenty years, more than two million southern Sudanese are dead and nearly five million southern Sudanese have been displaced by starvation and violence.[7]

Throughout its history, Sudan has rarely known peace or stability. Civil war erupted before the nation gained independence from Britain in 1956.[8] There was a brief period of peace from 1972 to 1983.[9] The roots of conflict and violence have remained the same: British-ruled Sudan was not one country, but two.[10] Paul Salopek describes the conflict and its history: The south is tropical, underdeveloped, and populated by almost one hundred tribes or ethnic groups of African descent, including Dinkas, Nuers, and Azandes. By contrast, the north is drier, wealthier, and linked financially and culturally to the Muslim Middle East. These two groups—northern Arabs and southern blacks—have been at odds since the nineteenth century, when northern slave raiders preyed on the tribes of the south.[11]

Today the territorial line of conflict that divides the country is also a symbolic line that represents radical diversity: religious, economic, linguistic, cultural, and ethnic. Presently the rebel SPLM along with the SPLA, control much of the southern third of Sudan. The soldiers carry spears, Kalashnikovs, and AK-47s and have fought for greater autonomy and for their independence. The SPLA has approximately 40,000 soldiers while the northern army has an unlimited supply of men willing to fight for the government. It was, in a very real sense, a war of attrition, as the south has lost almost an entire generation of young men to the war. The northern government—the Government of Sudan (GOS)—in Khartoum, now dominated by Islamic fundamentalists, dropped bombs from Antanovs (old Russian cargo planes) targeting not only SPLA sites but also southern civilians, hospitals, schools, village centers, places of worship, and market-places. In addition to regular bombings, the GOS also employed famines, slavery, and mass murder as weapons of terror, genocide, oppression, and mass destruction. Sudanese slaves—usually women and children—are routinely beaten, raped, genitally mutilated, and forced to convert to Islam. Credible estimates of the number of Sudanese slaves range from at least 20,000 to as much as 200,000.[12]

B. Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA)

The SPLA was formed in 1983 and since that time it has fought against the established government. It is largely but not exclusively southern and Christian, and its declared aims are the establishment of a secular, democratic Sudan. Although many southerners would prefer independence, the SPLM/A has talked primarily of unity within a confederal system. Its founder and leader, John Garang, held a doctorate from Iowa State University and was militarily trained in the United States. He was from the Dinka, Sudan’s largest ethnic group.

The observations of the Washington Office on Africa, no friend of the northern Khartoum government, are instructive: “[F]actional fighting in the South is responsible for a greater number of deaths than direct clashes between Sudanese government forces and southern rebels.”[13] It should be noted that tens of thousands of southerners have died as a result of the SPLA’s ethnically-motivated violence which certainly would qualify as genocide-like behavior. Amnesty International has stated that the SPLA has attacked civilians “for ethnic reasons.”[14] The Clinton Administration’s Sudan specialist, John Prendergast, has documented the existence of ethnic tensions between the largely Dinka SPLA and the Nuer tribe as well as communities in Equatoria in southern Sudan ever since the SPLA came into being in 1983, with the SPLA showing an “absolute disregard for their human rights.”[15] SPLA ethnic cleansing continued until the late 1990s. The UN special rapporteur for human rights in Sudan has also reported on SPLA violence towards non-Dinka ethnic groups, groups which, in the words of the BBC, also “accused the SPLA of becoming an army of occupation.”[16]

The important point being made is that it is incorrect to attribute all human rights abuses to the government of Sudan, despite the fact that the United States has for several years supported the SPLA, a group described by The New York Times as “brutal and predatory,” stating that they “have behaved like an occupying army, killing, raping and pillaging” in southern Sudan.[17] Eight US-based humanitarian organizations working in Sudan, including CARE, World Vision, Church World Service, Save the Children, and the American Refugee Committee, have also publicly stated that the SPLA has “engaged for years in the most serious human rights abuses, including extrajudicial killings, beatings, arbitrary detention, slavery, etc.”[18]

Human Rights Watch states that “the SPLA has a history of gross abuses of human rights and has not made any effort to establish accountability. Its abuses today remain serious.”[19] The SPLA has been guilty of massive and systemic food aid diversion. For example, the Roman Catholic Bishop of the starvation-affected Diocese of Rumbek, Monsignor Caesar Mazzolari, has stated that the SPLA was diverting 65 percent of the food aid going into rebel-held areas of southern Sudan. This was also reported by humanitarian aid workers. Agence France Presse also reported that: “Much of the relief food going to more than a million famine victims in rebel-held areas of southern Sudan is ending up in the hands of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA).”[20]

Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) was established in April 1989, as a consortium of two UN agencies—UNICEF and the World Food Programme—as well as more than 35 non-governmental organizations. Operating in southern Sudan after a devastating famine—a result of drought and civil war—OLS negotiated with the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army to deliver humanitarian assistance to all civilians in need, regardless of their location. Although OLS has saved lives and assisted hundreds of thousands of people, its mission is far from over. Lack of timely rain and displacement of people prevents farmers from cultivation, making it impossible for the people of South Sudan to become self-sufficient.

Operation Lifeline Sudan was unprecedented in post-war history when it came into being in 1989, in as much as it was the first time within a civil war situation that a government put aside issues of sovereignty and agreed to the delivery of assistance by outside agencies to rebel-dominated parts of the same country.[21] It is matter of record that the present Sudanese government agreed to increase the number of food delivery sites in the south from 20 in 1993 to over 180 during the height of the Sudanese famine in 1998.[22]Well over one hundred sites are served today. The vast majority of these sites are within rebel-held areas in southern Sudan—and both the government and international community are fully aware that perhaps more than half of such food aid never reaches the civilians for whom it is intended, being diverted by the SPLA for its own use.[23]

In January, 2000, the SPLA issued an ultimatum to humanitarian aid agencies active within SPLA-controlled areas of southern Sudan, demanding that they sign an agreement which strictly controlled their activities and dictated their relationship with the SPLA. The SPLA stated that those non-governmental organizations that failed to sign the document by March 1, 2000, would cease to be the security responsibility of the SPLA and would be “dealt with accordingly.”[24] The European Commission publicly condemned this “explicit threat made by the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) to the safety of humanitarian agencies.”[25] Eleven international humanitarian aid agencies, including some 149 personnel working under the umbrella of Operation Lifeline Sudan, felt themselves unable to remain active in southern Sudan under such conditions.[26] These groups included organizations such as CARE, Oxfam, Medecins sans Frontieres, Medecins du Monde, Save the Children, World Vision International, and the Carter Center, which handled about 75 percent of the humanitarian aid entering southern Sudan.[27] The withdrawal of these non-governmental organizations (NGOs) directly affected $40 million worth of aid programs.[28] The expelled aid agencies stated that one million southern Sudanese were at risk as a result of the SPLA’s decision to expel the NGOs.[29]

C. Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA)

Because they were bombed by their government and exploited by rogues in the rebel army who are supposedly fighting for their freedom, many southern Sudanese fled for Uganda—the country which is directly south of Sudan. A terrifying extremist group, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), patrols the border of southern Sudan and northern Uganda attacking villages and refugee camps with grotesque violence. These butchers kill and attack those trying to leave southern Sudan for the safety of refugee camps. Also, the LRA frequently crosses the Ugandan border and invades villages in southern Sudan. The LRA is notorious for filling its ranks by abducting children. Atrocities committed by this group include mass murder, forced prostitution, rape, forced cannibalism, and mutilation.[30]

III. Southern Sudanese Chaplains: Non-imperial and The Embodiment of Peace

A. The History of the SPLA Chaplaincy Program

Churches in southern Sudan were commissioned to establish and implement a chaplaincy program in July of 1997, when the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) and the SPLM/A held a weeklong dialogue and conference to enhance progress toward the establishment of a secular, democratic government in southern Sudan.[31] This was a way for both groups to reaffirm their commitment to the liberation of the people of southern Sudan and the marginalized areas. The meeting of over 300 delegates was attended by leaders of the SPLM, members of the five member churches of the NSCC (Episcopal, Catholic, Presbyterian and African Inland churches, and Sudan Pentecostal Church), SPLA commanders, governors, commissioners of civil authorities, leaders of the women and youth groups, and civilians. The meeting was also attended by church representatives from Kenya, Canada, South Africa, some nongovernmental organizations, the World Council of Churches, and the All Africa Conference of Churches. The chairman of the SPLM and Commander in Chief of the SPLA, Dr. John Garang de Mabior, and the chairman of the NSCC executive committee, Rt. Rev. Bishop Joseph Marona, led the meetings.[32]

Conducted in an honest and open atmosphere, the meeting called for progress toward the establishment of a secular, democratic government in southern Sudan. It recommended that the SPLM/A and the NSCC maintain a regular dialogue as a forum for church/state consultation to promote common objectives and resolve conflict and misunderstanding that existed between the two.[33] Relations between the NSCC and the SPLM/A had deteriorated over the years, as the churches that gave the liberation movement full support at the beginning of the current in 1983, became increasingly critical of the excesses, violence, armed struggle, and the lack of consideration shown by some individual members of the movement and army for the rights of civilians.[34] This meeting was initiated by both the SPLM and NSCC to discuss common issues and to recognize and acknowledge their distinct identities and responsibilities that could be used to achieve a just and lasting peace and to free the Sudanese people from oppression, abuse, and terror.

The SPLM was mandated to guide the political development of southern Sudan by strengthening civil authority for the realization of democratic governance.[35]The churches were commissioned to care for the spiritual welfare of the people and to be a voice for the poor and dispossessed, contributing to the social and political formation of Sudan.[36] The meeting also resolved that the churches 1) pursue reconciliation and unity amongst the political and military groups struggling for liberation, 2) establish programs and education for soldiers and the population on humanitarian principles and human rights, 3) assign chaplains to the SPLA to pursue reconciliation and to enforce the education programs and education on humanitarian principles and human rights, 4) be involved in the regional peace initiative under the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, and 5) be involved in the reconstruction and re-building of basic infrastructures of society, including demobilization and de-mining/mining awareness campaigns.[37]

Since this meeting the SPLM set up civic structures in its liberated areas with governors and commissioners of civil authorities with the appointment of secretaries for agriculture, education, health, and other departments. The churches began training a small group of chaplains and assigning them to serve the SPLA in 1999. The impact of the chaplaincy program was seen immediately in the fact that the SPLA stopped recruiting children soldiers. Over the years there has been a decrease in violations in rules of engagement, the establishment of methods of care for POWs, and increased care and protection of civilians. All of the reports of SPLA atrocities in the previous part of this essay refer to actions during the mid to late 1990s, before the chaplaincy program was commissioned in 1997 and implemented in 1999. Since that time there have been very few reports of SPLA violence toward civilians.

B. Increased Training

In late 1999, Bishop Caesar Mazzolari, the Bishop of the Catholic Diocese of Rumbrek, wrote a plea for peace to chiefs and traditional leaders, civil leading servants, military commanders, and civilians to make the year 2000 a holy year—a year of reconciliation, renewal, and practical commitment to being involved with every branch and aspect of life in the Sudanese community.[38] He recommended the introduction of chaplains to visit regularly the army to instruct the soldier on catechesis, the moral and social teachings of the Christian faith, the sanctity of life, and the demands to respect human dignity for all—particularly soldiers, POWs, and civilians. The bishop also stated that the church would begin assisting the training of chaplains “to do chaplaincy service among the SPLA/M militants.”[39] Bishop Mazzolari commented that some soldiers asked him to make arrangements for clergy or chaplains to visit the barracks since some of the evils the soldiers were accused of committing were the result of a lack of spiritual guidance. He also noted that like their government counterparts, the SPLA soldiers have been accused of committing atrocities and other evils against civilians.

More support for increased chaplaincy training came from Rev. Major General Ian Durie, the executive chairman of Accts Military Ministries International, at the East African Christian Military Leadership Conference in Kenya, March 8-10, 2001. Rev. Durie stated clearly that southern Sudan’s continuing struggle against the intolerable injustice of the Khartoum government of Sudan needs to obtain a “greater degree of international approval in the eyes of the world.”[40] If the SPLA is to be taken seriously it must follow the guidelines for a legitimate use of force and must not be a rogue rebel army that violates the human rights of civilians.

C. Goal and Purpose of Chaplains

For the SPLA, the relevance of human rights knowledge for conflict resolution practitioners does not only apply in situations where a denial of human rights by the GOS is a cause of high-intensity conflict, but it also applies to instances were gross human rights violations occur as a consequence of violent conflict.[41] In these cases, chaplains and others who intervene “must be aware of the rules and instruments that can help to regulate or mitigate conflict.”[42] In its assessment of five large UN field operations, the international non-governmental organization Human Rights Watch noted that human rights were often integrated only to a limited extent into peacekeeping efforts, to the detriment of these operations.[43] According to Human Rights Watch, the deployment of human rights monitors as part of the peacekeeping mission limited human rights violations and contributed to the peace process by strengthening the prospects for lasting peace.[44] The SPLA has engaged in this human rights initiative. It now has over 250 chaplains, trained in human rights standards, located throughout the territory under its control in an effort to limit and prevent abuses of rights. According to Michelle Parlevliet, the manager of the Human Rights and Conflict Management Program at the Centre for Conflict Resolution, the integration of human rights concerns into efforts to regulate and mitigate violent conflict in the short term, will lay the foundation for their inclusion in activities geared towards the long-term resolution of structural causes of conflict.[45]

Chaplains are sent to minister to SPLA soldiers, POWs, and civilians. Also, chaplains serve as clergy to the SPLA soldiers. This entails both leading soldiers spiritually and morally. They lead regular church services, meet with them individually, and visit them in the hospitals. In their ministry to the soldiers, chaplains counsel them in facing the guilt of being associated with the realities of war. One chaplain instructor, who graduated from the program and returned from the frontline to train other chaplains, explains: “Soldiers sometimes feel that they no longer belong to God after some of their actions. As soldiers they are used to the conditions, but as humans they are lacking both physically and spiritually.”[46]

As already noted, a major dimension of chaplains’ military duty is to serve as the moral conscience of the SPLA with respect to the treatment of civilians. During the war, chaplains also enforced the command to take prisoners when they surrender, rather than kill them. Before chaplains were assigned, if a northern soldier surrendered he would likely be killed. It is the command of the SPLA leaders to take prisoners and it is the chaplains’ duty to enforce that command. The chaplains also made sure the POWs were treated appropriately and fed well. The chaplains were taught and trained to ensure that POWs were well-treated and protected. They also made sure that captured GOS troops received the best medical treatment and food at the hospitals.

Chaplains are expected not only to encourage appropriate treatment of civilians by the SPLA but also to serve civilians. Many chaplains, when they are not leading services for soldiers, also serve as pastors or priests in villages near the frontlines. Some are sent to serve as chaplains to soldiers not on the frontlines but in SPLA-controlled areas. Now that there is a legitimate cease-fire and potential resolution to the conflict, some chaplains have become clergy for churches in southern Sudan while others remain chaplains for the army.

Graduates of the chaplain training program are immediately commissioned as first lieutenants in the SPLA. To graduate, each student must successfully complete a rigorous twelve-month training process. Students start every day with 90-minutes of physical training. They have classes five days a week and eight hour a day, where they are trained in biblical studies, theology, and comparative religion. When they are not in classes they are fulfilling practical ministry requirements: visiting the hospitals and jails, serving the local churches, and taking care of any remaining POWs. There were two cities (Nimule and Yei) where chaplaincy training compounds existed. Now, only the camp in Nimule is training students. In 1997 there were six full-time chaplains and 36 assistants serving in the SPLA. Since 1997, over 250 chaplains have been trained at Nimule and approximately 100 have been trained at Yei.

While chaplains serve in a religious plural context of Islam, Christianity, and indigenous African religions, they do not lead interfaith services. The chaplaincy program only trains and assigns Christian chaplains. The chaplains are responsible for advising commanders, only when asked, on religious or ethical matters that are external to the command. This includes: religious factors in an area of operations; ethical decision making in terms of military activity; and religious, ethical, or moral issues that may have impact on mission accomplishment.

Between 2001 and 2005, I traveled to southern Sudan four times to train SPLA chaplains and I have seen the human suffering: southern soldiers injured in the war, northern POWs, bomb craters in school yards, pastors with limbs missing because they were helping others take cover as bombs exploded, recurrent droughts, orphaned children, cramped refugee camps, mass starvation, slaving raids, and epidemics of diseases. But, I have also seen the courage and perseverance of the southern Sudanese people, who have been oppressed by their government, abused by the rebel army organized to defend them, and terrorized by an extremist group in northern Uganda. I have also witnessed the bravery, dedication, and servant-leadership exhibited by the chaplains of the SPLA. The chaplains, many of whom were soldiers who have decided to go back to the frontlines of the conflict without their weapons to minister as clergy, are called to embody peace and serve SPLA soldiers, GOS prisoners of war, and civilians. Some chaplains have been killed already and all the chaplains know the dangers they are facing. In the despair and darkness of the brutal realities of Sudan, there is hope.


[1]President George W. Bush in a speech to the American Jewish Committee (AJC) on May 3, 2001, in Washington, D.C.
[2]Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in a conversation with Dr. Charles Jacobs, head of the American Anti-Slavery Group, at the State Department, September 15, 1999. Quoted in Nat Hentoff, “Slaughter of the Innocents,” Village Voice (April 25, 2000).
[3]Articles 18, 4, and 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations resolution 217(A) of December 10, 1948.
[4]Quoted in John Eibner and Charles Jacob, “‘Old Europe’ and Sudan’s Jihad,” Boston Globe (March 11, 2003), p. A11.
[5]Sharia is often referred to as Islamic law, but this is wrong, as only a small part is irrefutably based upon the core Islamic text, the Qur´an. A correct definition would either be “Islam-inspired,” “Islam-derived,” or “the law system of Muslims.” This is well known to most Muslims, yet Sharia is always referred to as “based upon the Qur´an,” hence it is the “will of God.” Calling the Sharia “law” can be misleading, as Sharia extends beyond law. Sharia is more like a worldview: the totality of religious, political, social, domestic, and private life. Sharia is primarily meant for all Muslims, but applies to a certain extent also for people living inside a Muslim society. It contains the rules by which the Muslim world is governed (or should govern itself) and forms the basis for relations between humans and God, between individuals, whether Muslim or non-Muslim, as well as between humans and things which are part of creation. The Sharia contains the rules by which a Muslim society is organized and governed, and it provides the means to resolve conflicts among individuals and between the individual and the state.
[6]John Garang, the SPLA’s leader who earned a doctorate from Iowa State University, presented five hypothetical solution modalities in the Sudan conflict in a public lecture at the Carter Center in Atlanta, GA (March 25, 2002). He supported a unified confederation model that allows for religious diversity and does not enforce Sharia on all Sudanese. Garang explained that the total independence model was initially the option when the SPLM/A first organized, but is no longer the goal. However, in conversations I have had with them, the total independence model seems to be the mindset of the SPLA field commanders.
[7]John Eibner and Charles Jacob, “‘Old Europe’ and Sudan’s Jihad,” Boston Globe (March 11, 2003), p. A11.
[8]For more see Douglas H. Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil War (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003), pp. 21-37; and Carmelo Conte, The Sudan as a Nation, translated by Richard Hill (Milano: Giuffrè, 1976), pp. 135-168.
[9]For more see Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil War, pp. 39-57.
[10]For more see Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil War, pp. 1-19.
[11]Paul Salopek, “Shattered Sudan: Drilling for Oil, Hoping for Peace,” National Geographic (February 2003), p. 35.
[12]John Eibner and Charles Jacob, “‘Old Europe’ and Sudan’s Jihad,” Boston Globe (March 11, 2003), p. A11.
[13]Washington Office on Africa, “Slavery, War and Peace in Sudan,” December 16, 1999.
[14] “Sudan: The Ravages of War: Political Killings and Humanitarian Disaster,” Amnesty International, London, AI Index: AFR 54/29/93 (September 29, 1993), p.21.
[15]John Prendergast, Crisis Response: Humanitarian Band-Aids in Sudan and Somalia (London: Pluto Press, 1997), p. 57.
[16]See “Growing Friction in Rebel-Held Southern Sudan,” news article by BBC Online on June 9, 1999.
[17] “Misguided Relief to Sudan,” New York Times, December 6, 1999.
[18] “Humanitarian Organizations Oppose Plan Providing Food to Sudanese Rebels,” press release by InterAction: The American Council for Voluntary International Action, Washington-DC, November 30, 1999.
[19]“Rights Group Warns US Against Feeding Sudan Rebels,” news article by Reuters on December 14, 1999.
[20]“Aid for Sudan Ending Up With SPLA: Relief Workers,” news article by Agence France Presse on July 21, 1998.
[21]The European-Sudanese Public Affairs Council, “Irresponsible, Inaccurate, and Inept,” November 12, 2001, http://www.espac.org/media_pages/washington_post.html (accessed January 15, 2004).
[22]The European-Sudanese Public Affairs Council, “Irresponsible, Inaccurate, and Inept,” November 12, 2001, http://www.espac.org/media_pages/washington_post.html (accessed January 15, 2004).
[23]Sudan.Net, “USAID Chief Natsios on Sudan,” November 12, 2001, http://www.sudan.net/news/press/postedr/52.shtml (accessed January 15, 2004).
[24]“‘Sudan: Focus on NGO Pullout from SPLM,” UN IRIN, Nairobi, February 29, 2000.
[25]“European Commission Statement on Southern Sudan,” European Union, February 29, 2000.
[26]The European-Sudanese Public Affairs Council, “Unacceptable Demands: Subverting Humanitarian Aid in Sudan,” March 2000, http://www.espac.org/famine_pages/unacceptable.html (accessed January 15, 2004).
[27]“‘Rights Group Urges More Talks on Sudan Relief,” news article by Associated Press on March 8, 2000.
[28]“Seven Aid Agencies Urge Renewed Negotiations for Relief to Southern Sudan,” Associated Press, March 1, 2000.
[29]“Expelled Aid Agencies Say Million at Risk in Sudan,” Reuters, March 1, 2000.
[30]At the beginning of my trip to Sudan and Uganda in October 2002, the LRA attacked one of the two refugee camps set-up for displaced Sudanese refugees and internally displaced Ugandans. As people fled the attacked refugee camp, many went to the only other refugee camp in Kiryandango, causing the already cramped camp to double in population and put a strain on the feeding center and medical resources. At the end of that trip, the LRA attacked and brutalized a village just north of the Kiryandango refugee camp by beheading three men and then forcing members of the village to eat parts of the mutilated remains.
[31]Come, Let us Reason Together: Report of the Historic Dialogue held between the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and the New Sudan Council of Churches (Africa Church Information Services, Nairobi, 1998).
[32]Ibid., pp. vii-viii..
[33]Ibid., pp. 16-20.
[34]Ibid., pp. 3-9.
[35]Ibid., pp. 21-24.
[36]Ibid., pp. 25-27.
[37]Ibid., pp. 6-7.
[38]Bishop Caesar Mazzolari, “Plea for peace on the dawn of new millennium,” open letter to leaders in the Bahr El Ghazal region, November 21, 1999.
[39]Bishop Mazzolari is quoting from a Dicoese of Rumbrek Consultors meeting held September 18-19, 1999.
[40]Rev. Major General Ian Durie, “Serving with Honor,” part 3, p. 2. The three lectures given by Rev. Durie are available on the website of The Association of Military Christian Fellowship, http://www.sc2002.co.uk/page13.html (Accessed August 1, 2003).
[41]Michelle Parlevliet, “Bridging the Divide – Exploring the relationship between human rights and conflict management,” Track Two 11(1), March 2002, pp. 1-52. Centre for Conflict Resolution, http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/two/11_1/index111.html (August 1, 2003).
[42]Michelle Parlevliet, “Bridging the Divide – Exploring the relationship between human rights and conflict management,” Track Two 11(1), March 2002, pp. 1-52. Centre for Conflict Resolution, http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/two/11_1/index111.html (August 1, 2003).
[43]Human Rights Watch, “The Lost Agenda: Human Rights and UN Field Operations,” Washington, London, New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993, pp. 1-35.
[44]Human Rights Watch, “The Lost Agenda: Human Rights and UN Field Operations,” Washington, London, New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993, pp. 1-35.
[45]Michelle Parlevliet, “Bridging the Divide – Exploring the relationship between human rights and conflict management,” Track Two 11(1), March 2002, pp. 1-52. Centre for Conflict Resolution, http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/two/11_1/index111.html (August 1, 2003).
[46]Personal interview (October 11, 2002).


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