Part 1:
Faith and Doubt in a Revolutionary Divinity
The discussion begins with Nick querying Mark’s defence of hedonism in
his new and thus far unpublished work, Wicked
Wisdom: A Scandalous A-Z of Over 250 Life Issues (which, as the subtitle
suggests, offers a somewhat controversial take on a wide array of topics, from
adultery and celibacy to God and the meaning of life).
NT. You
have recently defended a form of hedonism. Hedonism is of course the view that
only pleasure has value, and taken as an ethical theory hedonism is the view
that something is the morally right thing to do only if acting in this way will
bring about pleasure. Interpreted in this broad fashion, hedonism is open to a
host of objections, above all the objection that it amounts to a philosophy
suitable only for pigs: “better to be a Socrates dissatisfied than a pig satisfied”.
That is why, I presume, you qualify your hedonism, and so you call for a
“responsible” and “ecological” hedonism, where pleasure is not to be pursued at
the expense of, say, the welfare of other people. And so you give examples such
as the following: “non-smokers shouldn’t be exposed to our smoking, unless
non-smokers choose to be in our pleasurable company,” and “the pregnant
shouldn’t drink to excess or take recreational drugs, for such hedonism is
irresponsible to the extreme, harming the unborn” (Wicked Wisdom, unpublished ms). This sounds reasonable enough, but
how do you justify these claims? Why shouldn’t I advocate and live out an
unrestrained form of hedonism? Why shouldn’t I try to maximize my own pleasure,
even if this means causing great harm to other people or to the natural
environment? Don’t get me wrong: I’m not seeking to defend any form of
hedonism. And I’m not really asking why you adopt this particular morality or
moral viewpoint rather than some other one. Rather, what I’m asking is: What
grounds (or reasons) do you have for thinking that (e.g.) it is objectively true that “the pregnant
shouldn’t drink to excess”? You certainly write as if you believe that it is
objectively true that “the pregnant shouldn’t drink to excess”, but why do you
believe this? Why couldn’t someone say that this judgement, that “the pregnant
shouldn’t drink to excess”, is nothing more than a puritanical prejudice that
we more liberated ones need to overturn?
So as to stop you from guessing, or second-guessing, my
intentions, here is my underlying argument: Any morality, yours included, is
groundless – that is to say, it is purely subjective and hence can make no
claim on anyone else – unless it be grounded in God.
MM. Hedonism,
ethics, ‘God’: these are some of the most enjoyable, fascinating, and intertwined
‘Big Questions’; hence, they are a great set of opening questions – so open, in
fact, that they are somewhat abyssal. Let us begin traversing this wonderful matrix
of abysses with your last opening question or claim – that ‘morality’ can only be
grounded in ‘God’. Nothing can be grounded in ‘God’ – for ‘God’ is more
groundless than anything. How so? Firstly, ‘God’ is a possible reality – one reason for the scare quotes (the other
reason being that ‘God’ is a heavily-masculinized/patriarchal word ‘God’ – I
will therefore use alternatives, including ‘God-dess’ [with a hyphen] which
connotes that the divine may be both ‘male’ and ‘female’ – and perhaps/probably
beyond gender and/or gendered otherwise). The lack of such evidence for deity is
self-evident. Nor is there any self-evident or incontestable proof against the existence of deity.
Therefore, unless there is some kind of indubitable divine self-disclosure –
some kind of ‘Second Coming’, for example – the divine remains a possibility. A possibility. Nothing more
– and nothing less.
Secondly, not only do we not know whether there is divinity (its ‘thatness’), but we do
not know what it may be like (its ‘whatness’). If there be deity, if there
be God-dess, we don’t know what kind of deity or God-dess it may be. What, in
other words, is the ‘personality’ of divinity? What kind of ‘person’ is
God-dess? What kind of ‘ethics’ – if any
– would it have? Who knows? – and how could one prove it? After all, when you say that one’s ethics – you use the
word ‘morality’ but I despise the word ‘morality’ and the puritanism it
represents – when one’s ethics or values can only be ‘grounded in God’, then one
not only presumes divine existence but also its ‘essence’. Can one
authoritatively describe or define the divine, and therefore ground one’s
ethics in it? On the contrary, is there anything more elusive and mysterious
and abyssal – ‘groundless’ in an also-affirmative sense – than the divine? How
can one ‘ground’ one’s ethics – and laws and politics, etc. – on
something/someone so elusive and abyssal, on something/someone possible. Hence: there is nothing more groundless (in both senses) than
God-dess. Hence: the astounding array of human construals of divinity –
many/most of them oppressive in varying ways and degrees: patriarchal,
puritanical, colonizing, anthropocentric, etc. We have made gods in our image – and justified our ethics and
laws and governments by them, and vice versa. So many constructions – so many
destructive constructions, so many vicious circles and cyclical violences. A
wicked wisdomist, on the other hand, attacks and abolishes these oppressive theologies-moralities-rulerships,
and is instead governed by a ruthlessly true
Reason(ing) that construes divinity – and laws and politics, etc. – worthy of
belief and worth following. Let’s take each of these terms and possibilities in
turn, ultimately leading back to the original set of questions, of the abyss
and bliss of hedonism. Perhaps my faith in the divine may have its ‘origins’/‘inspirations’
‘beyond’/‘beside’ a ruthlessly true thinking
(certain elements of the Bible and religiously-inspired traditions, for
example), but my construals of it must be informed and filtered by such
thinking. (I shall speak more of what is ‘true’
and what is ‘thinking’.)
What does all of this mean when it comes to the divine, to
ethics, to hedonism? To begin with, I can only believe in a truly progressive deity – indeed, an ethico-politically revolutionary divinity. This kind of
revolutionary deity is ‘also’ a hedonistic entity, a divinity that adores
corporeality and its attendant pleasures. Such a hedonism is not a vulgar,
caricatured one of selfishness and hyper-consumption and irresponsibility –
i.e. a hedonism somewhat practiced today. No: our ‘wickedly wise’ hedonism is
responsible and disciplined and aware and considerate; it is a primary pursuit
but not the only one. It is a hedonism, in other words, that is just and
sociable and ecological. An ethical hedonism. A divine hedonism. Hence, it is unsurprising that the hedonism I
espouse coheres with the divinity I construe and desire, for both of them are
informed by what can be, for the time being (a time without divine
self-disclosure), the only ultimate ‘ground’ or ‘justification’ for such
abyssal issues: true thinking, a thinking
that is open ‘yet’ discerning; liberated ‘yet’ respectful; nuanced and provisional
and context-aware and sensitive to the individual and the particular ‘yet’ truly
universal – and therefore even forcefully imposable. For the time being,
thinking is ‘all’ we’ve got – and perhaps all we need. It may sound paradoxical
– it probably is, but this is commonplace when considering the abysses of Big
Questions, and perhaps a sign we’re on the right track or traversal – but our
hedonism must be thought-ful.
NT. Five
points, by way of response.
(1) You need to decide where you stand. Do you stand on
the side of theism (belief in God), or on the side of atheism (belief that
there is no God)? Or, rather than standing on any side, do you prefer to sit on
the fence by adopting an agnostic stance? In saying that God is nothing more
and nothing less than a possibility, it seems that you have settled for an
agnostic position. For, according to the agnostic, it is possible that there is
a God and it is possible that there is no God, and there is no (rational) way
to choose between these alternatives. But, later on, you seem to contradict
this agnostic position by professing that you believe in a “progressive” and
“revolutionary” deity. If that’s the case, then you do accept some form of
theism, some form of belief in God, after all. So which is it: God? no God? or
you do not know (or cannot decide)?
He looked out the
window and was surprised to find that the sun had already set and darkness had
enveloped the sky. It was raining heavily, with inaudible flashes of lightning
striking across the horizon.
As he was gazing
at the crackling wood in the fireplace, he was struck by the large number of falsehoods
he had picked up since his childhood, and by the highly dubious and doubtful
edifice he had subsequently constructed out of them. He realized that, for once
in his life, he must demolish everything, from top to bottom, and start right
again from the start. He began to doubt: methodically, maniacally. No stone was
left unturned.
He began with the
world itself, everything other, other selves as well as other things. And from
there he worked his way back to himself, his inner being, the other other.
The rain began to
fall harder, and it began to hail. He was worried that the force of the
hailstorm would soon shatter the windows. He nevertheless continued his
journey, digging deeper, extending the search further, moving ahead more
rapidly… until he finally hit rock bottom and could go no further. There was a
method in his madness and a madness in his method, and it seemed now to be
paying off. He had reached the foundations: something he could not doubt.
(2) Let’s turn, then, to the reasons you give for refusing
to commit to belief in God. Here you seem to set the standard of proof so high
that it is almost inevitable that the verdict will be negative (against theism,
and also against atheism for that matter). It’s as though you do not wish this
issue (of the existence of God) to be resolved one way or the other, and so as
to ensure this you raise the standard of proof impossibly high.
Now, pay close attention to what standard of proof you
demand: “self-evident or incontestable proof”, “some kind of indubitable divine
self-disclosure”. By these standards, it is not only the existence of God that
would be placed in doubt, but the existence of anything whatsoever, from ordinary chairs and tables to exotic
quarks and leptons. If there is anything that is self-evident and
incontestable, it is that nothing is self-evident and incontestable. So, I
think you need to be more modest in your standards as to what is to count as
‘good evidence’, especially when dealing with subjects such as philosophy and
theology, where the standards of proof and justification will differ quite
significantly from those employed in more empirical and mathematical fields
such as physics and astronomy.
(3) So, is there any ‘good evidence’ (broadly construed)
for the existence of God? I do not wish to enter into this well-worn (perhaps
overworn) debate here, but I do think you need to get clear on the kind of
deity you wish to affirm, deny, or remain agnostic about. For there are
innumerable gods, and simply because one is thinking and discussing these
matters does not guarantee that one is not beholden to some conceptual idol
rather than the real and living God.
But now we run up against another apparent contradiction
in your thought. On the one hand, you proclaim that the nature of God (God’s
‘whatness’, as you put it) is simply beyond our ken: it is unknown, if not
forever unknowable. But on the other hand, you say quite a bit about the nature
of God! For you confidently go on to claim that (the true) God is “an
ethico-politically revolutionary divinity”, “a hedonistic entity, a divinity
that adores corporeality and its attendant pleasures.” So which is it: the
nature of God is unknowable? or there is at least something we can know about
God?
(4) Worse still, you have not provided any (good) reason
for accepting such a God. You have stressed, and quite rightly, that we often
create gods in our own image. But haven’t you done the exact same thing? Isn’t
your morally progressive God merely your own creation? Why should I, or anyone
else, accept such a God?
Perhaps your view is that the kind of thinking that you
describe as “a ruthlessly true thinking”
– a kind of thinking that is open, discerning, liberated, and so on – is what
ultimately grounds or justifies your conception of divinity. This sounds
promising, but why hold that this way of thinking coheres best with your
conception of divinity? Perhaps it coheres better with atheism, or some
traditional form of theism. How can you rule this out?
Midnight. It’s
always darkest at midnight. The fear of silence. Surreal, but so real.
In the moonlight
he noticed the lines on his hands, the lines that had always been there,
unnoticed. He tried to fathom and interpret them, like the lines he was accustomed
to reading in books, but he could not. He was startled by how his hands – their
rough texture, faded colour, trembling fingers with cuts and bruises – seemed
strange, unrecognisable. He grew increasingly worried.
Since that night
he would never see the lines again. The silencing of fear.
MM. Perhaps we should have started
with one question? – then again, is not every question related to every other
question? – is not every Big Question related to every other Big Question? I
enjoy your responses, their spirit, their passion. I’ll try to be
as brief as possible – but how brief can we be when we’re traversing abyssal
questions and provocative responses?
Response to Response (1): “You need to decide where you
stand”. It bears repeating, perhaps more formulaically: I believe but I don’t
know – the ‘but’ is somewhat superfluous, considering that belief is
precisely a lack of knowledge. My faith is a mixture of faith and doubt
and agnosticism – all good things. The element of unknowing is what
keeps things open and interesting – not to mention modest and humble. Neither
I nor you nor any creature on this good Earth ‘knows’ whether the Answer to
this Big Question is deity or nothingness. Theism, atheism, polytheism,
pantheism, etc., are all matters of faith, and as soon as anyone starts
presuming they actually Know, then what we get is dogmatism, fundamentalism,
extremism, scientism – sicknesses that oppress humanity and the planet in
countless ways.
Furthermore, what should be emphasized in a world that continues
to bias actuality over possibility is that ‘possibility’ also entails the possibility of actuality
(albeit an ‘unproven’ actuality), so when I say ‘something is possible’, it’s a
stronger assertion than what is normally associated with it. For me (a dreamer,
an idealist, a utopian – yes, yes), ‘the possible’ is charged with a certain
power: to say that ‘the divine is possible’ is quite a decision, quite a stand
– given the lack of evidence for it. And, since I believe and hope in the
reality of a deity, I want to believe and hope in a progressive and
revolutionary deity – the only kind that deserves the thinking believer’s
belief. I therefore don’t ‘contradict’ myself by mentioning belief and
agnosticism in one and the same breath: such is the only honourable position
for the humble, open-minded believer.
Response to Response (2): You raise the objection that my
standard of proof for the existence or non-existence of God-dess is ‘high’ –
but shouldn’t it be, considering what is at stake? Shouldn’t the only standard
for such an important Question with all sorts of real consequences be some kind
of self-evident self-revelation? Faith – true faith (not just conditioning,
habit, fear, etc.) – lacks demonstrability, self-evidence, self-disclosure.
Hence, the need to be modest and humble about one’s faith; hence, the need to
be modest and humble enough to be open to the possibility of being wrong.
Likewise for atheists: there is no ‘strong’ evidence, no ‘good’ reason for
atheism (not even the reason of bad religion). Hence: the thinking believer
respects the decision of the atheist, for atheism is perfectly reasonable. And
vice versa.
You do mention that “It’s as though you do not wish this
issue (of the existence of God) to be resolved one way or the other, and so as
to ensure this you raise the standard of proof impossibly high”. Perhaps/probably
I have a wish to keep open the question of the divine, with all its mystery and
possibility, but I think my greater wish is to find out the truth – it’s
frustrating not knowing, we humans want to know – but only some kind of
strong proof could do that for the thinking believer. Furthermore, I haven’t
raised the standard: the claim itself demands good evidence. (Should we also
propose, perhaps somewhat seriously, that divinity itself has raised the
standard? – perhaps to determine who has faith and who hasn’t? – perhaps the
divine has also set the standard to keep us on our epistemological toes?)
Of course, the question of evidence becomes even more
crucial when people start asserting not only the existence of divinity (its
thatness) but also its nature (its whatness) – but how can we know the personality
of deity? We can’t, for the time being. You also state: “If there is anything
that is self-evident and incontestable, it is that nothing is self-evident and
incontestable.” This is very eloquent – but untrue: that you and I are involved
in this very exchange is self-evident and incontestable. I can easily prove
that, in various ways. But I can’t prove the existence of deity.
Hyper-Cartesian doubt (‘nothing is self-evident’) may be fun for undergrad philosophy
students who have never been instructed to question and critique, but it also
gives philosophy a bad name – philosophy as sophistry.
Response to Response (3): You ask whether there is “any
‘good evidence”. I would say that there is much ‘anecdotal material’: from the scriptural
transmission of purported events, to the possibility of ‘paranormal’
experiences (stigmata, ghosts, UFO sightings, ESP, etc.), countless testimonies
from often very respectable and honest people, and perhaps even the sheer spiritedness
of existence (haven’t you ever felt someone’s gaze from afar?) – all
these suggest that there is ‘more’, and involved in this ‘More’ may be
divinity. However, despite the number and breadth of this material, it cannot
count as ‘definitive’ for various reasons: testimony is not always reliable;
our minds and bodies can play tricks on us; there are undiscovered scientific
explanations for a number of these experiences; people often lie; etc. A large
number of us witnessing the return of Christ on CNN – now that would be good
evidence.
You also return to the question of the whatness of deity
and suggest that “we run up against another apparent contradiction in your
thought…. On the one hand, you proclaim that the nature of God (God’s
‘whatness’, as you put it) is simply beyond our ken…. But on the other hand,
you say quite a bit about the nature of God!” But note what I say before I
begin to “say quite a bit”: “I can only believe in . . .” – once again, it
comes down to a matter of faith. I do not know the personality of deity, but as
a reasoning being, I can only believe in a divine ‘More’ that is good
and loving and open and liberating. You also end Response (3) with a set of
good questions: “So which is it: the nature of God is unknowable? or there is
at least something we can know about God?” Answer: Neither the thatness nor the
whatness of divinity is knowable; but if we are to believe in the divine, then
we should believe in a good God-dess.
Response to Response (4): Your next Response ties into the
nature of the divine (if there is any); you state: “Worse still, you have not
provided any (good) reason for accepting such a God”. To begin with, perhaps you’re
technically right when you remark that I haven’t provided any reason(s) for
accepting a revolutionary deity, but I think the reason/ing is implicit: as a thinking
believer, I can only believe in a good God. How can I, as a reasoning being,
believe in a cruel and puritanical god? How can I believe in a divine tyrant?
This is not to say that, if there is divinity, then there is the
possibility that it is all these terrible things – perhaps it may be, but such
a deity would be a demon. I believe in a God-dess that’s on the side of the
poor and the powerless. As to why? – that’s a good question. I’m not
sure if you can provide ‘reasons’ for preferring justice and goodness over
oppression and evil. Perhaps this ‘preference’ lies before or beyond our ladder
of reasoning. Perhaps this preference for one set of values over the other is
self-evident and incontestable. Perhaps not. So many ‘perhapses’ – maybe you
can help me out there.
You also remark: “You have stressed, and quite rightly,
that we often create gods in our own image. But haven’t you done the exact same
thing? Isn’t your morally progressive God merely your own creation? Why should
I, or anyone else, accept such a God?” These are good questions – abyssal, like
the Big Questions. Another ‘perhaps’ is needed here: perhaps I am
projecting those values I value onto/into the divine. Who knows? After all,
since we don’t know deity’s whatness, then we don’t know whether I am ‘merely’
projecting. However: the difference between my possible ‘projection’ and previous-continuing ones is that they
have generally been oppressive (patriarchal, violent, colonial, etc.) while my
figuration is closer to what a deity worthy of wonder and adoration should
reasonably possess (love, justice, openness, etc.). Furthermore, my
‘projection’ is a good thing for the Earth: by loving a liberating God-dess, we
ourselves may become better people transforming a disfigured world. Once again,
whether one accepts this kind of figuration depends on one’s ability to think.
What kind of deity should the thinking believer believe in? What kind of
divinity should we adore? Should we love and desire a good God-dess or a
devilish deity?
You do acknowledge that my
figuration of thinking (open, discerning, progressive, etc.) is what
“ultimately grounds or justifies” my figuration of deity, and you state that it
“sounds promising”, but ask “why hold that this way of thinking coheres best
with your conception of divinity? Perhaps it coheres better with atheism, or
some traditional form of theism”. Another good question followed by valid
possibilities. To begin with, an open, progressive thinking also coheres
with atheism – that’s why atheism must be considered a possibility. Nothing
more – and nothing less. However, this type of thinking allows for a variety of
possibilities – it’s a very hospitable logic, with the condition that each path
or possibility (theism/atheism/etc.) doesn’t try to kill the other. As long as
reasonable theisms and atheisms never forget that they are, for the time being,
possibilities (nothing more – and nothing less), then various paths can cohere
and co-habitate. Now, why does my figuration of divinity cohere ‘best’ (a word
I didn’t use, but perhaps I could) with this kind of thinking? Simple: the same
values apply to both. Both faith and reason should be governed by thoughtful
values (openness, progressiveness, etc.). This path ends up somewhere
amazing: the ‘faith/reason’ binary collapses insofar as our faith can become
more reasonable, and our reasoning more divine.